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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2A-8/10/76 
In the Matter of 
SOUTH COLONIE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 3014,: 
OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Upon the Charge of Violation of Section 210.1 
of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0108 
On December 30, 1975, Counsel to the New York State Public 
Employment Relations Board, filed a charge against South Colonie Teachers 
Association, Local 3014, of the American Federation of Teachers (Association) 
alleging that it violated CSL §210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, 
condoned and engaged in a twelve-day strike against the South Colonie Central 
School District (District) between September 4 and September 19, 1975, inclusive 
The Association admitted its participation in the strike, but alleged that the 
District engaged in such acts of extreme provocation as to detract from its 
responsibility for the strike. 
The record discloses that the District insisted that the Association 
agree to extend the workday from seven to seven-and-one-half hours as a pre-
condition to negotiations over wages. The Association refused, but was 
willing to negotiate over hours and wages, one in the context of the other. 
Noting that the strike in September was not a spontaneous reaction to the 
negotiating posture of the District, the hearing officer reasoned that extreme 
provocation was not a factor in it. He determined, and we agree, that the 
District's negotiating posture — which it enunciated at the outset of nego-
tiations and maintained for eight months — was unduly rigid. The hearing 
officer determined, however, that the defense of extreme provocation was not 
available to the Association because its proper remedy was to charge the 
District with a refusal to negotiate in good faith in violation of CSL §209-a.l 
(d) 
o 
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We reject this determination of the hearing officer and conclude 
that the negotiating posture of the District constituted an act of extreme 
provocation which detracts from the responsibility of the Association for the 
1 
strike. Extreme provocation is not an all-or-nothing matter. Even though 
collective negotiations is a process that is often fraught with tension, 
negotiating tactics that exacerbate those tensions unduly are within the 
coli&elrrtetfion—o~f therTaylpr "Law." "~TEe~~extent7of~~exonera~txoh"~o~f—tHe~employee"" 
organization varies with the extent to which the employer's improper conduct 
directly provokes the strike as well as ,'with the flagrancy of that conduct. 
Employer conduct that is not the immediate cause of a strike may, nevertheless, 
contribute to that strike by intensifying the conflict. In the instant case, 
we find that the District's conduct was sufficient to detract from the 
Association's responsibility for the strike and, thus, to diminish the 
2 
penalty to be imposed upon it. 
We also find that, unlike most teacher strikes, the instant strike 
had an impact not only upon public welfare, but also upon public safety. On 
several occasions, the conduct of striking teachers necessitated the presence 
of policemen in order to protect public safety. Picketing teachers 
blocked entranceways to the District's property and sprayed some automobiles 
with paint remover. 
1^  Not all employer improper practices are of this character. In the instant 
case, the employer's conduct impaired the entire negotiations process and 
engendered continual frustration for the Association and its members. 
2_ The availability of an improper practice charge alleging a violation of 
CSL §209-a.l(d) is not an entirely adequate remedy because of present 
limitations upon our authority to remedy such violations. 
4ot> 
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But for the employer's actions of extreme provocation, we would 
have imposed a dues deduction forfeiture of fifteen months; because of those 
actions of extreme provocation, we impose a dues deduction forfeiture of nine 
months. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER t h a t t h e dues deduc t ion p r i v i l e g e s of 
- Sauth__Colonie__Teachers__Asso_ciation,L_Lacal_3014i,_of___ 
the American Federation of Teachers, be suspended for 
a period of nine (9) months commencing on the first 
practicable day; thereafter, no dues shall be deducte|d 
on its behalf by the South Colonie Central School 
District until South Colonie Teachers Association, 
Local 3014 of the American Federation of Teachers, 
affirms that it no longer asserts the right to strike 
as is required by the provisions of CSL §210.3(g) 
Dated: New York, New York 
August 10, 1976 
Dbert D. Helsby, Chairman 
Joseph/R. Crowley 
Jjj& ld&&u<*. 
Ida Klaus 
£ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF ALBANY, NEW YORK AND HARRY MAIKELS, 
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
WORKS, 
Respondents, 
-and-
COUNCIL 66, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, 
#2B-8/10/76 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1758 
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO 
and GEORGE STROKES, 
Charging Parties. 
The charge herein was filed by Council 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and George 
Strokes, its president (charging parties) on September 3, 1975. It alleges 
that the City of Albany and Harry Maikels, Albany's Commissioner of the 
Department of Public Works, committed improper practices in violation of Civil 
Service Law Section 209-a.l when Mr. Maikels first instituted disciplinary 
charges against Mr. Strokes and then when he discharged Mr. Strokes. The charge 
alleges that the reason for the institution of disciplinary action against 
Strokes and his discharge was that Mr. Strokes engaged in protected activities 
on behalf of Council 66. 
After an extended hearing, the hearing officer determined that Maikels, 
as agent for the City of Albany, had interfered with Strokes' right of organi-
zation in violation of CSL Section 209-a.l(a) and had discriminated against him 
for the purpose of discouraging participation in Council 66 in violation of 
CSL Section 209-a.l(c). He found no evidence that Maikels or the City of Albany 
attempted to dominate or interfere with the formation of, or administration of, 
Council 66, which would have been a violation of CSL Section 209-a.l(b), or that 
the City refused to negotiate in good faith with Council 66, which would have 
been a violation of CSL Section 209-a.l(d). 
4367 
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The charge brought against Strokes was initiated by three of his 
fellow employees. It alleged that Strokes had operated a crane in a reckless 
manner and injured one of his fellow employees. Although there were suspicious 
circumstances surrounding the bringing of the charge, the hearing officer 
resolved credibility questions in favor of the City and Maikels. Consequently, 
he declined to conclude that the bringing of the charge was improper. Following 
:t-h-e-c-ha-r'ge-s-y-a-disciplinary hearing-was-held-under GSL-Section—75—by-General 
South, the Director of Civil Defense of Albany County. He recommended that 
Strokes be discharged. Charging parties raise some questions concerning the 
decision-making process, but those questions played no part in the decision 
below. The hearing officer properly determined that questions involving pos-
sible irregularities in the disciplinary proceeding are for consideration during 
a review of the determination in that proceeding. Thus, the sole basis for the 
determination of the hearing officer was that Maikels' decision to discharge 
Strokes was related to his demonstrated hostility to Council 66. Inherent in 
this was a conclusion that Maikels did not rely upon the recommendation of 
General South in discharging Strokes. 
In reaching his decision, the hearing officer first determined that 
yfaikels knew, prior to the issuance of the disciplinary charge, that Strokes 
had been an active member and supporter of Council 66. He next found that 
Maikels had been hostile to Council 66 and to Strokes because of Strokes' 
activity and support of Council 66. Finally, he found that Maikels had decided 
to discharge Strokes based upon his own observations of Strokes' performance, 
rather than upon the recommendation of General South, and upon considerations 
other than those specified in the charge, and that but for Strokes protected 
activities on behalf of Council 66, he would not have done so. On the basis 
Df these three findings of fact, the hearing officer concluded that the dis-
charge was improperly motivated and a violation of CSL Sections 209-a.l(a) and 
(c). 4368 
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The City of Albany has filed exceptions to the hearing officer's 
decision. It has excepted both to the hearing officer's conclusion that Mr. 
Strokes was discharged by reason of his engaging in protected activities and to 
the proposed remedy that Mr. Strokes be reinstated in his former position and 
be made whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of his discharge. The 
memorandum in support of the exceptions presents only one argument. It is that 
the City must not be powerless to discipline an inadequate employee even if it 
is shown "that the disciplining city official had exhibited anti-union animus." 
It states "that if the City had good cause to discipline Strokes then the 
presence or absence of anti-union animus is irrelevant." The City relies upon 
a decision of the Supreme Court, New York County, in Foran v. Murphy, 73 Misc. 2jd 
486 (1973). In that case, a police captain had been discharged for perjury and 
appealed from the discharge on the ground that the proceedings against him were 
politically motivated. The court said: 
"So long as the evidence of guilt of the specification is 
sufficient, and the proceedings devoid of legal error, the 
court may not attempt to divine respondents' motives in 
proceeding against a malefactor; the motives are irrelevant." 
Whatever the validity of the proposition that motivation underlying the 
discharge of an employee is irrelevant under the circumstances recited in the 
Foran case, that proposition does not extend to the Taylor Law. By its terms, 
the reason why an.employee is restrained or discriminated against is an element 
of the violation set forth in CSL Sections 209-a.l(a) and (c). PERB must con-
sider the City's motivation. The test applied by the hearing officer in doing 
so was the correct one. It inquired into whether the substantially motivating 
cause of the discharge was the City's, or its agent's, animus towards Council 
66. This test was first articulated in Matter of City of Albany and the Albany 
Professional Permanent Firefighters' Association, 3 PERB 113096 (1970). It was 
confirmed by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals in Matter of City 
4369 
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of Albany v. Helsby, 36 AD2d 348 (1971); modified on other grounds 29 NY2d 433 
(1972). The Court of Appeals noted that, in this regard, powers similar to 
those exercised by PERB were also exercised by the State Labor Relations Board 
and the State Human Rights Commission under other State statutes, as well as by 
the National Labor Relations Board under the NLRA. 
Having reviewed the record, we confirm the conclusion of the hearing 
officer that the decision to discharge Strokes was made by Maikels and that, in 
making that decision, he was motivated by considerations that are proscribed 
by CSL Sections 209-a.l(a) and (c). We also determine that the remedy recom-
mended by the hearing officer is the appropriate one. 
Accordingly, 
WE ORDER: 1. That the City of Albany restore the status 
quo as existed prior to its improper action by 
(a) offering Strokes reinstatement to his 
former position, and 
(b) making George Strokes whole for any loss 
of pay suffered by reason of his discharge 
from the date of his termination to the date 
of offered reinstatement, less any earnings 
derived from other employment, and 
2. That the City of Albany cease and desist 
from engaging in similar coercive and discrimi-
natory conduct towards George Strokes and its 
employees because of their exercise of the 
protected right of organization under CSL 
Section 202, and 
Board - U-1758 
Dated: New York, New York 
J
 August 107 1976 
-5 
3. That the City of Albany conspicuously post 
an appropriate notice, to be supplied by this 
Board, at locations ordinarily used for written 
communications to employees in the Department 
of Public Works and the Bureau of Water. 
Joseph R. Crowley 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: 
1. WE WILL restore the status quo by offering George Strokes reinstatement to . 
his former position, making him whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason 
of his discharge from the date of his termination to the date of offered, 
reinstatement less any earnings derived from other employment. 
2. WE WILL neither discriminate nor interfere with, restrain or coerce employees 
as a result of their exercise of rights protected by C.S.L. §202. 
CITY OF ALBANY 
Employer 
Dated. 
August 10, 1976 
By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. Sfj^fi 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#20-8/10/76 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. U-2051 
In the Matter of 
LOCUST VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-""and-"- " 
LOCUST VALLEY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Locust Valley School 
Employees Association (Association) from the decision of the hearing officer 
dismissing its charge against Locust Valley Central School District (employer). 
1 
The Association had alleged that the employer violated CSL §209-a.l(a) and (c) 
by failing to pay two members of the Association's negotiating committee — its 
president and the chairperson of its Food Service Chapter — for the time spent 
by them at a factfinding hearing conducted during school hours by a PERB-
appointed factfinder. 
As alleged in the charge, the employer did not pay the two Association 
representatives for the time spent by them at the factfinding hearing. However 
non-unit administrators who represented the employer at the factfinding 
hearing were paid their regular salary for that day. Both the Association's 
representatives, namely, its president and the chairperson of the 
Food Service Chapter, are unit employees of the employer. 
The president is also paid a stipend by the Association for the 
1 These sections of the Act make it an improper employer practice to deliber-
ately "(a) interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the 
exercise of their rights guaranteed in section two hundred two for the 
' purpose of depriving them of such rights [and]...(c) to discriminate 
against any employee for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging member-
ship in, or participation in the activities of, any employee organization... 
Board - U-2051 
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services that he performs as president. 
The hearing officer determined that the employer was under no statutory 
obligation to pay the two Association representatives for their time spent at 
the factfinding hearing. It is to this determination that the Association has 
taken exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and the memoranda submitted by both parties, 
we endorse the analysis of the hearing officer and confirm his determination. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein should be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: New York, New York 
August 10, 1976 
Ifobert D. Helsby, ,-CThairman 
,L-;, 
*4L 9£0*' 
Ida Klaus 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D"8/10/76 
In the Matter of 
QUEENSBURY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
QUEENSBURY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2056 
On March 22, 1976, the Queensbury Faculty Association (QFA) filed a 
charge alleging that the Queensbury Union Free School District (District) had 
failed to negotiate in good faith in violation of Civil Service Law Section 
209-a.l(d) by refusing to negotiate over two demands that constituted mandatory 
subjects of negotiations. In its answer, submitted on March 29, 1976, the 
District argued that the two demands in question did not constitute mandatory 
subjects of negotiations. At a conference held on April 27, 1976, the parties 
clarified the issues in dispute between them, stipulated to the material facts, 
and jointly requested that this Board accord expedited treatment to the dispute 
under Section 204.4 of our Rules. The Stipulation specifies that the demands 
in question are: 
"UNIT WORK 
'B. ...furthermore, new educational programs established by the District which 
require certification will be performed only by members of the bargaining 
unit.' 
TEACHING HOURS AND TEACHER LOAD 
'F. Teachers of Kindergarten and Grade One will not be assigned more than one 
hundred twenty-five (125) students per week. ' This number is to be 
determined by the homeroom enrollment. 
G. Teachers of Grades Two to Six will not be assigned more than one hundred 
thirty-five (135) students per week. This number is to be determined by 
the homeroom enrollment. 
Board - U-2056 -2 
H. Teachers of Grades 7-12 will not be assigned more than one hundred 
thirty-five (135) students per day. The administration will strive 
for not more than one hundred twelve (112) students per day in the 
area of English. 
I. The work load for teachers of specialized areas as Home Economics and 
Industrial Arts will not exceed ninety (90) students per day; Physical 
Ed. not to exceed two hundred (200) and Art or Music is not to exceed 
one hundred fifty (150) per day.'" 
QFA submitted a brief in support of its posture that the demands are 
mandatory subjects of negotiations on May 10, 1976. As to the first demand, it 
argues that the clause is designed to protect employees against the destruction 
of their negotiating unit. But for such a clause, the employer could eliminate 
programs that are serviced by unit employees and develop alternate programs 
that would be serviced by non-unit employees. As to the second demand, QFA 
argues that its proposal would not impose numerical limitations upon class size 
and, thus, is not covered by the reasoning of Matter of West Irondequoit Board 
of Education, 4 PEEB 1f3070 (1971), confirmed in Matter of West Irondequoit 
Teachers Association v. Helsby, 35 NY2d 46 (1974). it further argues that the 
demand affords sufficient flexibility to the employer regarding the number of 
teacher periods per day and number of students per class to bring it within the 
reasoning of Matter of Yorktown Faculty Association, 7 PEKB 1(3030 (1974). 
The District, in its brief, submitted on May 12, 1976, argues that the 
unit work demand would interfere unduly with the school district's right to 
make decisions involving its mode and method of operation in that it "would 
effectively be 'handcuffed' from formulating new programs in the most economic 
ways." (emphasis in original) The District argues that the second demand is 
but a paraphrase of class size and that it is not comparable to the demand in 
the Yorktown case in which class size was but one element in a complex formula 
for determining teacher workload. 
4376 
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Both positions were well-briefed and oral arguments were presented to 
the Board on July 23, 1976. We now determine that the two demands in question 
do not constitute mandatory subjects of negotiation. The concerns expressed 
by QFA, in support of the negotiability of its demand that new educational pro-
grams established by the District which require certification should be 
j_p^ rj_ormed__jonly_bx_u^ .^ ejffiloyees, do not justify a determinationjthat^ the 
demand is a mandatory subject of negotiations. The restraints that QFA would 
impose on the District would interfere with the exercise of its right to 
formulate new programs and the utilization of appropriate resources, such 
as Boards of Cooperational Educational Services. Further, if actions of the 
employer in the future appear to be for the purpose of depriving employees 
I/ 
of their organizational rights, an employee organization may seek relief. 
We are also persuaded that QFA's demand, standing alone as it does, placing 
a. numerical limitation upon the number of students per day or per week is 
essentially, as a practical matter, a class size demand within the meaning of 
West Irondequoit, and is unlike the situation in Yorktown with its more complex 
formula. 
Accordingly, 
WE ORDER that the charge herein should be, and hereby is, dismissed 
in its entirety". 
Dated: New York, New York 
August 10, 1976 
RoSert D. Helsby, ,-Cihairman 
Ida Klaus 
\l CSL Section 209-a.l(a). 4877 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHERN CAYUGA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
and -
SOUTHERN CAYUGA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Charging- Party-
In the Matter of 
MORAVIA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
and -
MORAVIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
CAYUGA-ONONDAGA BOCES, 
Respondent, 
and -
CAYUGA-ONONDAGA BOCES TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
SKANEATELES CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
and -
SKANEATELES TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
#2E-8/10/76 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2064 
CASE NO. U-2065 
CASE NO. U-2066 
CASE No. U-2067 
These four cases are consolidated for decision. They all involve the 
same issues. All four charging parties are employee organizations representing 
teachers and all are represented by the same attorney. Three of the employers 
are Central School Districts and the fourth is a Board of Cooperative zi^f? 
Board - Cases U-2064 through U-2067 -2 
Educational Services. There is a single spokesman for all four respondents. 
The materials submitted on behalf of the four charging parties and the four 
respondents are virtually identical. 
The four charges were filed between March 19, 1976 and March 23, 
1976. They each allege that the respondent in each case violated CSL 
§§209-a.l(a), (b) and (d)— by unilaterally passing resolutions during 
November 1975 changing the definition of the bargaining unit and thereafter 
refusing either to rescind its resolution or to enter into negotiations con-
cerning the changes in the negotiating unit. In each instance the charging 
party had originally achieved status as the representative of teachers in 
collective negotiations by having been recognized as such by the appropriate 
respondent. In each instance there was in existence a collectively negotiated 
agreement that was to expire on June30, 1976, the end of respondent's 
fiscal year; thus, in each instance the month of November 1975 was the appro-
priate challenge period (CSL §201.3 of our Rules). In none of these matters 
was it alleged that alteration of the negotiating unit was motivated by 
animus toward the charging party. 
Upon receiving the four charges, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation determined that respondents were not duty-bound 
to negotiate alterations in the negotiating units and he dismissed the charges 
for failing to allege facts that would constitute improper practices (§202.2(a) 
of our Rules). Thus, no hearing was ever held. 
1 These sections make it"...an improper practice for a public employer or its 
agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section two hundred 
two for the purpose of depriving them of such rights; (b) to dominate or 
interfere with the formation or administration of any employee organization 
for the purpose of depriving them of such rights;...or (d) to refuse to 
negotiate in good faith with the duly recognized or certified representa-
tives of its public employees." M<ir'Hff-\ 
43 ih 
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In all four cases the charging party appealed from the determination 
of the Director. Unfortunately, although the notices of appeal in the four 
cases were filed with the Board within the required time, there was a problem 
in their service upon the four respondents. Through inadvertence, the appeals 
in the cases were mixed up so that each respondent received the right trans-
mittal letter but the wrong statement of exceptions. When the confusion was 
discovered by the attorney representing the charging parties, the correct 
statements of exceptions were sent to the four respondents but, by then, the 
time for service of the appeals had passed. Included in the responses of the 
four respondents is the argument that the appeals should be dismissed because 
service of them was not timely. None of the responses allege prejudice by 
reason of the confused and delayed service of the appeals. Indeed, it does not 
appear that there could have been any prejudice inasmuch as the appeals dealt 
with identical issues and contained identical language except for the names 
of the parties. It may be that the late service constitutes a jurisdictional 
defect depriving this Board of authority to consider the appeals. The 
responses, however, do not advance this argument and we are not persuaded 
that we must dismiss the appeals. Absent such compulsion, we are not 
prepared to deny charging parties the opportunity to be heard on the merits. 
Reaching the merits, we find that the Director has properly stated 
and applied the Taylor Law, Charging parties argue that PERB should follow 
the private sector practice ±>y prohibiting a'public employer from unilaterally 
altering the representative status of an employee organization except where 
it has serious doubt of that organization's majority status. They note that in 
the private sector it is irrelevant whether or not the employee organization 
was originally granted representative status through Board certification or 
voluntary recognition. In this, they fail to discern several differences 
between the National Labor Relations Act and the Taylor Law. The Taylor Law 
40 or. ooil 
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specifically provides that an employee organization may achieve representation 
status either through certification or recognition (CSL§204) by "the board 
or government, as the case may be, [which] shall...define the appropriate 
employer-employee negotiating unit..." (CSL§207). The Taylor Law also provides 
that the employer's ability to service its constituency effectively is a 
-factor—to-be_considered-in-determininlng--negotiating_undLtS-_CCSl—§.2-Q.7_._l_(_c.)_X. 
Finally, the Taylor Law provides that an element in employer 
improper practices other than the refusal to negotiate in good faith is a design 
to deprive employees of their right of organization (CSL §209-a.l(a), (b) and 
(c)), thus making animus an essential element in both the pleading and proof 
of such charges. 
Had there been an allegation of animus, the unilateral action of the 
employer might have raised questions under §§209-a.l(a) and (b). Absent such 
an allegation, respondents' unilateral action raises no question under the 
Taylor Law, In Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., v. PERB (65 Misc. 
2d 544, 547, Albany County [1971]), the State Supreme Court held that, 
"The Legislature gave employee organizations a specific 
protected period of unchallenged representation status as 
set forth in subdivision (c) of section 209 and that when 
that period expired, as it admittedly did in this matter, 
the employer is free again to act pursuant to section 204 
to recognize the same or a different employee organization for 
the purpose of negotiating collectively." 
The New York State Court of Appeals in Civil Service Employees Association v. 
Helsby (21 NY2d 541, 548 [1968]) discussed the differences between the 
public and private sectors, saying: 
4oOJL 
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"The matters of time, budgets, and appropriations, as well 
as the special obligations of public employers, may well 
explain the conferring of power on the public employer to 
recognize and negotiate with employee organizations, untrammeled 
by representation dispute proceedings until they have been 
resolved by the Board through certifications of appropriate 
bargaining units and employee organizations." 
This__language __of _the__C_ourt_o_f_Ap_p_eals_indicatesi_tJiat_._chaj^ g^__Da^ i^ s__were__not _ 
without a means of seeking redress for the four respondents' action in 
altering the negotiating units. They could have instituted a proceeding for 
certification of appropriate negotiating units. Relief under the improper 
practice provisions of the Law, however, is not available to them and the 
charges must be dismissed, 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charges in each of the four cases 
be, and they hereby are, dismissed in their entirety. 
Dated: New York, New York 
August 10, 1976 
-g^ *- Aj2&*c. 
Ida Klaus 
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( 1 0 - 7 5 ) 
STATIC Of NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IK.oP.D 
I n t h e M a t t e r o f 
EAST -HAMPTON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer , 
- a n d - • 
SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL CHAPTER,' CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. , 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
- a n d -
EAST HAMPTON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,' 
NON-TEACHING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
I n t e r v e n e r : 
#2F-8 /10 /76 
CASE NO. 0-1.370 
A representation-proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Pair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected ,-
P\irsuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Pair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that East Hampton Union Free School 
District, Non-Teaching Employees Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
f the above-named public employer, in the unit described below, 
s their' exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
egotiatiens and the settlement, of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All full and part time clerical, custodial 
employees, and monitors. 
Excluded: . Secretary to the district principal, bookkeeper 
and all other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public eraplover 
shall negotiate collectively with East Hampton Union Free School . 
District, Non-Teaching Employees Association 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
\7ith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall-
legotiate collectively with such employes organization in. the 
3etermin;j tion of, and administration of, grievances. 
.Signed on the io day of August ] « 76 
ROBERT" D. HELSBYfcha i rman 
j>6sirpH R. CROWLEY•/ 
fjyjJjO 
IDA KLAUS 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS B1, ,iD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
COUNTY OF-SULLIVAN, 
-and-
Employer, 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES' INTERNATIONAL 
UNION, AFL-CIO,' LOCAL 32E, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
SULLIVAN.COUNTY CHAPTER OF CIVIL SER-
VICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
#26-8/10/76 
CASE N O / C - 1 3 8 7 
— ^ 'eERTrF-I-eA-TI-ON-OF-R-EPR-SSgNTATT-VE-AND-OR-DER-TO-NEGOTrA-TE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to. the-authority vested in'the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that SULLIVAN. COUNTY CHAPTER OF 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer,.in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances.-
Unit 
SEE ATTACHED 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with SULLIVAN COUNTY.CHAPTER OF CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
3etermination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 10 day of August 19 76 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, Chairman 
{MM, 
~~sra .JOSEPH R. CROWLEY/ 
X i £ < ^ 
IDA KLAUS 
J. A J. AX AV-iiTAi^iN J. 
All provisional, probationary, and permanent employees of the 
employer, except the employees of the Nurses' Unit, represented 
by the New York State Nurses Association, Department of Public 
Works Unit, Department of Public Works Foremen's Unit, Sheriff's 
Department, Sullivan County Community College Administration 
and Faculty, Elected and Appointed Officials, Director of Nursing 
Services, Supervising Public Health Nurse, Tax Map Supervisor, 
Probation Director, Sealer of Weights and Measures, Motor Vehicle 
Supervisor, Director of Social Services, Director of Administra-
tive Services, Deputy Commissioner of Public Works, General Foreman, 
Assistant General Foreman, Office Manager, Department of Public 
Works, seasonal employees, part-time employees working less than 
2 0 hours per week, and any employees acting in the following 
capacities, without regard to civil service title: Secretary-
Deputy Clerk, Board of Supervisors (1), Personnel Assistants (2), 
Confidential Secretary to Budget Director (1), Confidential 
Secretary to Administrative Assistant of the Board of Supervisors 
-"(•"l^ T- Conf-identiai--Secretary—to-County—Attorney— {-%-)-, — : --—•-—•-
Secretary to the President of Sullivan County Community College 
(1), Secretary to 'the Vice President of Sullivan County 
Community College (1), Secretary to the Dean of Faculty of 
Sullivan County Community College (1), Secretary to the Dean of• 
Administration of Sullivan County Community College (1).
 # 
Secretary to the Assistant Dean of Administration of the 
Sullivan County Community College (1), Secretary to the Commissioner 
of Public Works (1) and the Manpower Director (1). The numbers 
in parentheses represent the number of employees now in such jobs. 
In the event that additional employees are required to fill such 
jobs in excess of the number herein specified, the Employer and 
the Union' shall convene a committee to examine, and determine 
the exclusion of such additional employees. . 
4o6D 
PERB 58 
( 1 0 - 7 5) 
STATE OF NEK YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS DO..;XD 
IN THE MATTER 
NEW YORK STATE 
-and-
OF 
THRUWAY AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
NYS THRUWAY LOCAL 698 AFL-CIO SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, = 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE 
INC 
Petitioner, 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, : 
Intervenor. 
#2H-S/10/76 
CASE NO. C-1395 
"—CERTIFIt^ TION--OF'-REPR-ESE.HTATIVE-AN-B-ORBER^ Te^ NEGOT-I-ATE — 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of. Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the.Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public.employer,•in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the'purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances.. 
Unit: Included: All toll collectors, maintenance and 
clerical employees. 
Excluded: All part-time, seasonal, short-term 
temporary and all other employees. 
Further, IT IS1ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIA-
TION, INC. 
and enter into a written.agreement with such employee organization 
dith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
3etermination of, and administration of, grievances. 
signed on the io clay °'f August 1 9 76 
ROBERT D. HELSBY'TCHAIRMAN 
^ffaAiumemoj 
JOSEPH R. CROWLEY. 
/ f c ^S t i ^S - 4381 
IDA KLAUS 
PERB 58 
(10-75) 
STATE OF HEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS B^A'XD 
—uN THE MATTER OF 
THOMAS F. MAYONE, SHERIFF AND THE 
COUNTY OF ULSTER, 
Joint Employer, 
-and-' 
ULSTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S EMPLOYEES. 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner. 
#21-8/10/76 
CASE NO. C-1384 
-—-- CERTTI^I'CATrOgr^QF'RSPRESgNTfiTIVE^AND^ORDER'TO^NEGOTIATE'-~^~ 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating.representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that ULSTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of .the above-named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the Ulster County 
Sheriff's Department. 
Excluded: All other employees of.the County 
of Ulster. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate, collectively with ULSTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC. 
and enter 'into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall-
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 10 day of- August 1976 
IDA KLAUS 
PURE 58 
( 1 0 - 7 5 ) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Hatter of 
COUNTY OF SULLIVAN AND THE SULLIVAN : 
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, 
-and-
Joint Employers, 
SULLIVAN COT727TY CHAPTER, THE CIVIL : 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION', INC. , 
: Petitioner. 
: 
#2J-8/10/76 
CASE NO. C-1393 
~^ "" ~CERTTFrCATrON"OF'REPRESSNTATIVE"AND-ORDER- TO-NEGOTrATE ~~ 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter.by the Pubiic Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment•Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of. the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Sullivan County Chapter, The 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. , 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described "below, 
as their exclusive representative for the'purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time Deputy Sheriffs in all 
titles of rank" and/or assignment. . • . 
Excluded:' Sheriff, the Under-sheriff, the Chief 
Deputy Sheriff, the .Assistant Chief 
Deputy Sheriff and the confidential 
secretarv to the-Sheriff. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Sullivan County Chapter, 
The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee' organization "in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 10th day of August 19 76 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, CHAIRMAN 
JOSEPH R."CROWLEY 
4387A 
